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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the Maidan Revolution in Kyiv (late 
2013–early 2014) and the ongoing armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
(early 2014) have been reflected in the collaboration networks of 
Ukrainian and Russian organizations in Sweden between 2013 
and  2016.
I use ERG models to account for the probabilities of ties between 
the organizations, depending on the network structure and individual 
attributes such as ethnic identification and the choice of a side to 
support in the conflict.
Results suggest that it is support for a certain side in the conflict, 
and not ethnic self-identification, which drives the clustering of the 
networks during the most violent period.
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In order to increase their influence and achieve certain 
other goals, most organizations tend to collaborate 
with other organizations that they believe share their 
perspectives and attitudes (Portes et al., 2008). 
Ethnic organizations mostly base their activities on 
perceptions of common “routes” and “roots” and tend 
to collaborate with similar others, and thus have a quite 
homophilous collaboration network. However, when a 
violent armed conflict in the homeland arises, it can 
be brought closer to the everyday space of diaspora 
through modern media and globalization processes 
(Baser, 2015; Brubaker, 2005; Féron, 2017; Féron 
and Lefort, 2019; Jabri, 2007; Oberschall, 2000). 
For example, the development of modern media has 
allowed a lot of war and conflict-related events to be 
available and witness-able across the geographical 
spaces simultaneously (Ukrainian Revolution at the 
end of 2013 – beginning of 2014 has been streamed 
by multiple channels online; Mosul battle streamed 
online via Facebook, and others).
A lot of ethnic/diasporic organizations in this 
context may mobilize their activism in order to show 
their support for or discontent with the events, 
especially if they perceive themselves as a group 
under attack (Oberschall, 2000). For example, Féron 
(2017; Féron and Lefort, 2019) discusses the case of 
conflict-generated diasporas that emerge as a direct 
response to the armed conflict in the home country. 
In addition, Baser (2005) looks more closely at the 
realities of Turks and Kurds living in Germany and 
Sweden and compares their experiences, which 
lead to different outcomes for the relationships 
between the two groups in these specific contexts. 
Other research on the interconnection of war in 
the homeland and diasporas include multiple case 
studies such as Palestinian, Irish, Armenian, Tamil, 
Rwandan Tutsi diasporas as well as studies of 
intergroup relations in the country of settlement, e.g., 
Sikh–Muslim relations in Britain (Féron, 2017; Koinova, 
2016; Moliner, 2007; and others). However, this type 
of research is still quite scarce, while most of the 
diaspora studies focus mostly on the ways in which 
diasporas can affect the peace-building processes in 
their home countries, as well as the political unrest 
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that they can be a part of in the country of settlement 
(Demmers, 2002; Féron, 2017).
Nevertheless, all this research, among others, show 
that an ongoing armed conflict in the home country 
can have the potential to affect the collaboration 
networks, which different ethnic organizations build 
with each other. Thus, shared ethnicity can lose its 
importance in how an organization decides to form a 
connection with another, and shared attitudes about 
the conflict can become a leading mechanism in 
forming collaborations. In other words, an ethnically 
homophilous collaboration network may reorient 
itself into clustering by attitudes toward the conflict, 
and thus actively choose to become homophilious 
based on that perceived value. An organization can, 
therefore, give a lesser degree of consideration to 
collaborate with another one solely on the basis of that 
organization’s claim of ethnic belonging, and choose 
the collaborations based on the perceived agreement 
on the politics in the home country. Alternatively, there 
might be a reconfiguration of the meaning of ethnic 
belonging, namely the attitudes toward the conflict 
may become a substantial part of identifying the 
potential collaborator as a “true” co-ethnic or not, 
and thus leading to the action of working together or 
rejection of any association.
In this paper, I focus on the collaboration networks 
of Ukrainian, Russian, and Russian-speakers’ 
organizations in Sweden to see the effects that their 
identified ethnicity and stand toward the conflict may 
have had on their structure. I account for the Swedish 
context and trace the evolution of the network, 
including its growth through the creation of the 
conflict-generated organizations, i.e., organizations 
that both through their name and activity description 
claim the war in Eastern Ukraine to be their main focus, 
agenda, and reason for existence. I do not claim to 
see the causal relationship or to distinguish the exact 
impact of the war on the collaboration networks since 
I specifically focus on the 2014 through 2016 period 
that saw the beginning of war in Eastern Ukraine and 
was the most violent period in terms of casualties. 
However, I suggest that there are some indications 
that the reflections of war have at least been present 
in the studied collaboration networks and thus had a 
significant enough impact, especially in the Ukrainian 
organizations’ case. Focusing on this conflict is 
particularly interesting since it allows us to follow its 
development from the early stages onwards, as well 
as follow the changes in the diasporic communities, 
in the context of the relatively high freedom of 
organization that Sweden provides.
I suggest that the concept of homophily is useful 
to understand ethnic organizations’ collaboration 
before the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine started, 
but the model of foci of activity is more applicable for 
the analysis of collaborations based on their attitudes 
toward the armed conflict. I suggest that engaging 
in activities that (do not) support a certain side in the 
conflict might have become a focus of activity for the 
organizations and reorganized the organizational field 
along the conflict lines that later became incorporated 
into the identification of the other organization’s ethnic 
belonging. Thus, ethnicity in terms of similar ideas on 
one’s “roots and routes” may become less steering for 
the collaboration decisions than identification with a 
certain side in the conflict.
The context of the study
Short background on the armed  
conflict in Eastern Ukraine
The current armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine can be 
traced back to the beginning of the Maidan Revolution 
in November 2013 when the protests against then 
President Yanukovych and the Parliament of Ukraine 
became large scale due to the President’s sudden 
decision not to sign a trade pact with the European 
Union. By late February 2014, there were more than a 
100 unarmed protesters that were killed, after which 
then President Yanukovych fled the country and a 
new Parliament was established (UN Documents 
for Ukraine). In March 2014, the Russian Federation 
annexed the Crimean peninsula, an autonomous 
region within Ukraine, claiming its ethnic belonging as 
Russian and the “necessity of defending the Russians 
in Crimea” (address by President of the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin). Soon thereafter, Russian-
backed rebels started an insurgency in two eastern 
regions of Ukraine: Luhansk and Donetsk (The World 
Bank: Conflict in Ukraine, 2017; OSCE statements). 
The most violent period of the conflict occurred in 
2014 and 2015. July 2014 also saw the downing of the 
MH17 flight by Russian-backed insurgents in Eastern 
Ukraine (Crash MH17, 2014).
The World Bank Organization estimates that 
over 4 million people in Eastern Ukraine, specifically 
the Donbas region, have been directly affected by 
the continuing conflict (The World Bank: Conflict in 
Ukraine, 2017). According to a 2015 OCHA report, the 
number of casualties due to the conflict was 30,729, 
with 21,396 wounded and 9,333 killed (OCHA, 2015). 
By 2016, the number of those killed reached more than 
10,000 (The World Bank: Conflict in Ukraine, 2017; 
UN Documents for Ukraine). In addition to casualties, 
2.7 million people have been displaced. At the time 
of this writing, the official ceasefire has often been 
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violated, and recent developments in the Ukrainian–
Russian relations (Russia seizing three naval ships in 
the Azov sea in late November 2018) point to a new 
phase of the crisis (UN Emergency Security Council 
Meeting on Seized Ukrainian Vessels).
Swedish context: response to the conflict 
in Eastern Ukraine and Ukrainians and 
Russians in Sweden
Sweden is a country with a high level of participation 
in civil society, with an astonishing number of 
251,000 “civil society” organizations, out of which 
156,845 are non-profit (Statistikmyndigheten SCB). 
It is relatively easy to register an organization if it 
is non-profit, including even applying for funding 
through the state. Sweden is quite welcoming to 
different types of non-violent, non-terrorist, ethnic 
activism, which creates good grounds for practicing 
one’s ethnicity and taking part in homeland politics 
through demonstrations and other similar activities 
(Baser, 2015).
In the context of the Ukrainian–Russian conflict, 
Sweden has been very supportive of Ukraine. One 
example is the multiple visits by the Swedish foreign 
affairs ex-ministers Carl Bildt (March, 2014) and 
Margot Wallström in 2017. In addition, Sweden has 
been offering humanitarian, financial, technical, and 
even police training aid to Ukraine since the war 
unraveled, through organizations such as Sida and 
Riksbanken (The National Bank of Sweden) (Sveriges 
Riksbank and Sida: Ukraine). Moreover, within its 
Regional Strategy for Cooperation with Eastern 
Europe, launched in November 2014, Ukraine is the 
biggest recipient (European External Action Service 
– European Commission).
In 2018, there were 21,930 people born in the 
Russian Federation and 9,924 born in Ukraine living in 
Sweden (Statistikmyndigheten SCB). According to the 
Swedish Migration Office, of the people seeking asylum 
from Ukraine during the years of the conflict, only 32 
applicants were approved in 2014 and just 29 in 2015 
(Migrationsverket, 2017). Thus, it can be assumed that 
the Ukrainian population living in Sweden has not been 
significantly affected by migration due to the armed 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine. However, the economic and 
political situation of Ukraine has no doubt influenced 
the decision-making process of emigration from the 
country.
The history of Ukrainian and Russian populations’ 
settlements in Sweden is, to a great extent, 
speculative and mixed. Throughout the Soviet Union 
period, most people coming from any republic within 
the Union would often be counted either as Soviet or 
Russian. Therefore, it is not easy to describe a clear 
and distinct history of every population. However, 
some knowledge has been passed on, both through 
the official governmental institutions, organizations, 
and individual people. The information below is 
based on interviews with the representatives of 
different Russian, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian 
organizations, Russian and Ukrainian embassies, and 
Swedish Statistical Bureau.
When it comes to Ukrainians in Sweden 
throughout the twentieth century, one of the first 
bigger waves came as prisoners of the 1939 to 
1940 Winter War between Finland and the Soviet 
Union as well as more coming during the later 
years of the Second World War. By the mid-1950s, 
the community had managed to create some 
organizations (Embassy of Ukraine in Sweden). 
Another wave of immigration to Sweden came 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and included 
mostly women. Thus, by 2000, there were 441 men 
and 1,018 women born in Ukraine living in Sweden 
(Statistikmyndigheten SCB). This statistics, however, 
has to be viewed with caution since the registration 
by country of birth might have been mixed up with 
accounts of registering Soviet Union and not a 
particular Soviet republic before the late Soviet Union 
collapse.
The first big wave of emigration from Russia in 
the twentieth century came with the First World War 
and the 1917 Revolution, following thereafter with 
emigration caused by the Second World War and 
finally, following the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 
the early 1990s, the Russian population in Sweden 
consisted mostly of women (Embassy of the Russian 
Federation in the Kingdom of Sweden). Thus, by 
2000, there were 2,192 men and almost twice as 
much (4,331) women born in Russia living in Sweden 
(Statistikmyndigheten SCB).
Ukrainian and Russian organizations in Sweden 
also have interconnected, yet, distinct histories of 
existence in Sweden (most of this information is 
obtained from the interviews with representatives 
from the Ukrainian and Russian ethnic organizations). 
Many of these organizations were created before or 
after the Second World War, and some changed 
from the so-called Soviet “friendship” to independent 
nation-state-specific organizations. Most of 
them claim a very long history of existence even 
before they were (or formally could be) registered. 
Practicing activism based on cultural issues is 
rarely problematic in Sweden, and organizations 
that mostly focus on maintaining traditions and 
celebrations from the home country can easily apply 
4Ukrainian and Russian organizations in Sweden and the conflict back home
for funding from the state to organize such activities. 
On the other hand, to be a completely politically 
focused organization or one primarily occupied with 
humanitarian or other aid can be limiting, in terms of 
funding from the Swedish state and require stronger 
argumentation. This is even more complex for openly 
political organizations (Lagar för ideell förening – 
Bolagsverket). Therefore, many organizations may 
find it easier not to register with the state, although 
they do exist and organize meetings and events for 
their members. Most of these organizations use 
online social media platforms, where they can freely 
converse and diverge from mainstream ideas and 
thoughts.
All in all, the Swedish context is one with a 
relatively high freedom of organizational engagement 
and expression, which makes it quite easy for the 
diasporic communities to organize and push their 
agenda, often relating to raising awareness about 
their homeland or their situation in the country of 
settlement. Therefore, studying the collaboration 
networks in this context is not limited by the legal 
or oppressive regime structures in which similar 
practices cannot take place.
Here, it is also important to note that diaspora 
organizations, although often claiming to represent 
the totality of the group rarely do so (Ragazzi, 2012). 
Most often, diaspora groups are comprised of 
people who have a very special connection to the 
idea of “homeland” and stronger ethnic identification 
than their average co-ethnic. Thus, this research 
cannot be generalized to the total populations of 
either Ukrainians or Russians in Sweden, but only 
to very specific diasporic organizations with a strong 
and institutionalized sense of ethnic belonging. In 
addition, the research opens an important arena for 
studies on inter-ethnic and diasporic relations in the 
times of war in the home country.
Homophily
The idea behind the concept of homophily is often 
summarized by a saying “birds of a feather flock 
together,” famously applied by McPherson et al. 
(2001) and relates to the phenomenon that people 
tend to become friends with people who share 
some similar characteristics with them. Homophily 
is an ambivalent process that makes the flow of 
information faster for similar others, while at the 
same time implies that this flow of information is 
localized and not different from whatever the similar 
others already share (McPherson et al., 2001).
McPherson and Smith-Lovin (1987) distinguished 
between choice homophily and induced homophily. 
In their discussions, induced homophily covers the 
effect of group composition that is homogenous on 
the individual pairings with similar others. Similarly, 
Blau (1977) proposed that patterns of relationships 
including homophily are guided by relative group 
size and ability to gain contacts for in- and out-
group. In other words, the opportunity structure 
within the homogeneous group/organization that a 
pair is in dictates that the pair is also homogenous. 
Thus, in this view, baseline homophily reflects the 
composition at large and is affected by the relative 
size and pool of potential contacts. On the other 
hand, choice homophily is an individual bias or 
propensity to connect with similar others (Coleman, 
1958; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987; Marsden, 
1988). In other words, the composition at large has 
no effect on the homophily patterns in the group.
Multiple studies have pointed to how homophily 
can be stronger or weaker for different types of 
ties as well as different socio-demographic or 
behavioral/attitudinal categories within the given 
context. When it comes to socio-demographic 
categories, such as sex, gender, age, or ethnicity, 
studies have been variable. In the case of gender, 
homophily is especially interesting since the group 
sizes at large are almost equal. The fact that gender 
homophily is strongly present in different societies 
and groups showcases that there is an individual 
or structural bias, since the organizational foci are 
gendered, as are workplaces and other activities 
(McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987; Eder and 
Hallinan, 1978). Marsden (1987) after controlling for 
kin showed that network composition of people with 
whom others discuss important matters is strongly 
gendered. Further, Ibarra (1992) found that men 
have stronger sex homophilous ties than women. 
Moreover, women with homophilous ties received 
support from other women and instrumental access 
through network ties to men, in her study of an 
advertising firm (Ibarra, 1992). When it comes to 
age, homophily patterns depend on the type of 
ties studied (McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987). 
In addition, since school classes are grouped by 
age, a strong baseline age homophily is induced 
(McPherson et al., 2001). Age homophily has also 
been shown to persist longer, most probably due 
to friendships formed at a younger age (McPherson 
et al., 2001; Marsden, 1987, 1988).
Homophily and ethnicity
Homophily based on ethnicity is a special case and 
has been explained by both contact opportunities 
(group size) and biases. Studies have shown that 
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smaller ethnicized and racialized groups share more 
networks with majority groups (Blau, 1977; Marsden, 
1988; McPherson et al., 2001). On the other hand, 
other studies (Marsden, 1987, among others) have 
shown that this pattern may be different for certain 
groups, where a smaller group shows a tendency 
for homophily despite the baseline expectation that 
smaller ethnic groups’ networks should include more 
majority group members. One explanation that these 
studies give for this anti-intuitive pattern is that some 
organizational foci are segregated by ethnicity and thus 
limit opportunities and create bias. Often, these overlap 
with social class and status. In the case of ethnic 
organizations, the process of defining ethnic belonging 
and cultural heritage becomes central and practical. 
These organizations are voluntary, and historically 
people have joined them in order to gain access to 
information networks and for work opportunities, 
among other things (Portes et al., 2008). Portes et al. 
(2008) write that in order to play a role in the nation-
state politics on minorities, people often organize 
in a formal, stronger, way to exercise more power. 
Similarly, Ooka and Wellman (2006) in their study on 
ethnic groups in Toronto showed that newly arrived 
migrants tend to have more homophilous networks 
that can be explained by both ethnic segregation (of 
neighborhoods, voluntary organizations, language, 
schools, etc.) and hidden value homophily, like tastes 
and information. In the context of ethnic organizations, 
ethnicity is constantly made and maintained through 
various organized events and similar activities.
Scott Feld’s (1981) foci of activity model is both 
complementary and explanatory for the analysis. Feld 
suggests a theory of focused social ties based on the 
idea that social networks are organized through shared 
focus and joint activity. He states that individuals often 
have little choice in their association with certain foci. 
While some activities can be chosen by individuals 
who then create social networks around them (e.g., 
playing tennis), social foci can be better understood 
as social structures that systematically constrain the 
choices of relationship formations (e.g., only certain 
people play or want to play tennis). Thus, people who 
are tied to each other through their relations to these 
focal activities also tend to be homogenous in other 
characteristics. Feld derives three propositions from 
his model. First, since we meet to associate, most 
relationships originate in focused activities. Second, 
these foci are usually homogeneous. Third, if foci are 
homogeneous, the ties that are created there also tend 
to be homogeneous (McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 
1987; McPherson et al., 2001).
The main basis of identification in ethnic 
organizations is (obviously) ethnicity, and since almost 
every organization’s activities evolve around the 
cultural heritage of the group they represent, it makes 
little sense for them to be heterogeneous in terms of 
collaborations with other ethnic organizations. Thus, 
unless two organizations share some similarities 
in their views on their “roots,” culture, or heritage, 
theoretically they should not have many reasons 
to collaborate. These similarities mostly relate to 
views on ethnicity and, in the case of Russian, 
Ukrainian, and Russian-speaking organizations, 
showcase a complex and specific ethnic boundary-
making process. One example is Russian-speaking 
organizations, which can include people from almost 
every ex-Soviet country. Inclusion of different cultural 
and religious holidays in such organizations forms 
a pan- (often Slavic)-ethnicity that connects all the 
specificities. In the case of Ukrainian and Russian 
organizations, the question of “similarity” of traditions 
and culture in general has been a loaded political 
topic, especially during the last several years when the 
war unraveled. The boundary between Ukrainian and 
Russian identifications has shifted continuously and is 
usually drawn on language spoken and/or country of 
origin. In the case of ethnic organizations, where each 
represents a group of people that are homogenous, 
at least in terms of how they self-identify through 
ethnicity (as someone representing a certain culture 
through membership in an organization), the focus 
of activity is usually traditions from the “homeland,” 
such as dancing or celebrating religious holidays, 
and relates to an already established sense of ethnic 
belonging (see discussion of homophily). However, 
when the war in the homeland starts abruptly, 
mobilization of the sense of ethnic belonging may lead 
to reinventing different activities and renegotiating 
collaborations on the basis of the attitude toward 
the ongoing war. Ethnic organizations – due to their 
already strong connection to the idea of homeland 
(Jabri, 2007; Demmers, 2002; Vertovec, 1999) – may 
regard taking a stand as a necessary point of activity 
in relation to their identification with certain ethnicity. 
However, if it is relatively easy to assign ethnicity to 
an organization through the already existing name, 
for example, the attitude toward the war could 
become a more complex process that is also related 
to maintaining the established ethnic identification. 
This may require more work, and organizations might 
feel the pressure to become active in support of or 
discontent with the ongoing situation at home. Thus, 
the focus of their activities may shift, from primarily 
ethnicity-maintaining cultural events like celebrating 
shared perspectives on the history and traditions to 
relating primarily to the developments of the political 
situation currently ongoing at home.
6Ukrainian and Russian organizations in Sweden and the conflict back home
Reorganizing the meanings of ethnicity 
through the focus of activity
Studies of ethnicity and inter-ethnic relationships 
usually tend to understand ethnicity as a 
characteristic at the core identity (Chow and 
Bowman, 2010). I believe taking the model of focused 
social ties (Feld, 1981) discussed above grants 
the possibility of studying ethnicity without these 
essentialist assumptions. It creates a theoretical 
possibility for understanding ethnicity and diasporic 
communities through action as constructed through 
maintenance of ethnic boundaries (Wimmer, 2008).
In the current study, I suggest that collaboration 
of ethnic organizations is often based on the 
perceptions of shared “routes” and heritage. 
However, in times of war in the homeland, a 
reorientation might take place, usually through 
activities such as demonstrations and different 
campaigns connected to the developments “back 
home.” In this way, the war in the homeland can 
become symbolically transported into the everyday 
of the diasporic organizations and thus become 
a focus of activity too. Often, in order to raise 
an awareness about the developments in the 
homeland, the best way for these organizations 
would be to gather as many people as they can. 
Hence, organize the similar others around them 
through activities related to the conflict that is 
happening thousands of miles away. At the same 
time, those who previously were non-political 
or even active at all might become mobilized to 
action as well. Therefore, the restructuring of the 
organizational field by the conflict attitudes might 
take place.
Put in other words, if the war in the homeland has 
no implication for the collaboration networks, they 
would probably be characterized either by same 
ethnicity pairs, or not dominated by ethnic identifi-
cation at all (only structural network characteristics 
would matter for the collaborations in this specific 
case, such as, e.g., large and famous organizations 
would be more likely to receive invitations to collabo-
rate). On the other hand, if collaborations tend to be 
dominated by pairs that share a similar attitude to-
ward the conflict, this could be a potential indicator 
that the war in the homeland has had a shaping role 
in the evolution of the collaboration networks.
Hypotheses
In this section, I aim to clarify three main hypotheses 
that follow from the theoretical discussion above:
H1. There is some collaboration between Ukrainian, 
Russian, and Russian-speakers’ organizations 
during the period studied. The collaborations 
are not dominated by organization pairs with 
the same ethnicity.
This hypothesis suggests that there is some 
collaboration between Ukrainian, Russian, and 
Russian-speakers’ organizations due to shared religion 
or traditions as well as, in some cases, a common 
spoken language.
H2. During the 2014 to 2016 period, Ukrainian 
organizations tended to collaborate with 
other Ukrainian organizations, and Russian 
organizations with other Russian organizations.
Organizations might have collaborated with each 
other along the homogenous narrative of a shared 
past and/ or language, similar ideas on common 
“roots,” etc., only within clear ethnic boundaries. 
This hypothesis refers to the possibility that during 
the Revolution and subsequent war, this line of 
organizational collaboration remained the same. This 
scenario would showcase that while ethnicity is the 
main focus of the organizations, the developments 
in Ukraine were not reflected in the processes of 
network clustering.
H3. Organizations that share attitudes relating 
to the conflict tend to collaborate more with 
each other than with organizations with other 
attitudes during the period studied.
In this scenario, organizational field of collaboration 
networks have reoriented from primarily subjectively 
identified ethnicity to standpoints on the armed 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Thus, the third hypothesis 
suggests that the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
can be regarded as a focus of activity for Russian 
and Ukrainian organizations in Sweden (see Fig. 1).
Data collection
The organizations researched in this study do 
not officially help with accommodation, work, or 
legal issues for the newly arrived migrants. The 
organizations that were created in the earliest 
period of critical developments in Ukraine (late 
2013–2014) were concerned with the protests, 
assessing them either positively and showing 
support or negatively and treating the revolution 
as a coup – in the latter case often connecting it to 
Western political power struggles and conspiracies, 
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or nationalist organizations active in Ukraine. Later, 
with the beginning of the armed conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine, a few organizations were created to send 
humanitarian help, among other activities, and 
some were created to spread information about the 
political developments in Ukraine.
Organizational network data collection started 
in early 2017. The network data were collected 
retrospectively through interviews and from official 
Facebook pages and websites of different Russian, 
Russian-speaking, and Ukrainian organizations. The 
main sampling method was to trace each organization 
from the connections of the previous one until the 
referrals led to the same organizations that were 
already in the database. The criteria for actors to 
appear in the network were: (i) the organization is 
Russian, Ukrainian, Russian/Ukrainian-speaking or 
active in connection with the conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
and (ii) the organization is based in Sweden. Actors 
could not be a political party or a governmental agency. 
Some organizations based outside of Sweden were 
included in the data collection but are not included in 
the data set for this analysis. The edges in the studied 
networks are all positive referrals and no negative (e.g. 
if organization A states that they will never collaborate 
with organization B, they have been excluded). 
Since the referral tracing data collection method was 
employed, some specific issues about the network 
boundaries should be mentioned. The first criteria for 
appearing in the network included organizations that 
are somehow active in connection with the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine. Some of such organizations were 
generated by the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, while 
others have a broader set of activities and included in 
their agenda only a few events and collaborations that 
had to do with the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. In the 
first case, the conflict-generated organizations have 
been included as an edge sender and receiver node. 
In the latter case, the organization was coded only as 
an edge receiver. This was done to limit the network 
to only those organizations that are primarily focused 
on the conflict or identify themselves as Russian, 
Russian-speaking, or Ukrainian, while including 
potential collaborations with organizations that have a 
broader set of activities and agenda overall. The main 
motivation for including those organizations only as 
edge receivers was also to account for the theoretical 
possibility that the antagonist organizations could 
be connected through these broader organizations. 
Therefore, if not included at all, the network structure 
could be seriously implicated. The cumulative data 
for the period from 2013 to 2016 included 352 edges 
between 86 different organizations. However, for this 
analysis, the final data set consisted of 59 organizations 
located in Sweden (including international ones with a 
chapter in Sweden) during the period 2014 to 2016.
Table 1 shows that there are 14 Ukrainian 
organizations and 6 Russian organizations that 
clearly identify as such. The category “mixed” 
includes organizations that have members that 
identify themselves as Russian, Ukrainian, or other 
countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union or 
are Russian-speaking. Some of these organizations 
also identify themselves as Slavic. The fact that 
there are more specifically Ukrainian organizations 
reflects the phenomenon described elsewhere 
(author’s other unpublished article), qualitatively, 
namely that the people who were not happy with the 
claims of neutrality of the pan-Slavic organizations 
could demand a clear standpoint and even leave 
the organization if that demand was not satisfied. 
Some of these people could also start their own 
organization. On the other hand, if an organization 
became more political during the war, some 
members might not have felt completely happy with 
such course of events, and leave the organization 
as well. Furthermore, many organizations in the 
data set have been created as a direct response to 
the conflict, while claiming no identification with a 
specific ethnicity.
It is important to also note here that since it has 
been possible to identify with a certain conflict side 
only after the conflict started, some of the already 
existing organizations had to choose whether they 
wanted to be neutral or not. Six out of the eight pro-
Russian organizations have been created directly to 
acknowledge their attitudes toward the conflict. This 
is visible through the names of these organizations 
as well as their open declarations. Out of all the 
Figure 1: Focus of the conflict for 
diasporic organizations in another 
country, a model.
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pro-Ukrainian organizations, only two were created 
during 2014 and started by organizing demonstrations 
to raise awareness about political developments in 
Ukraine during the month of the Maidan Revolution. 
The rest were pre-existing organizations that declared 
their support for the Ukrainian Revolution. An 
interesting case is portrayed by the fact that out of 
four explicitly Russian organizations, only one claims to 
politically align with the pro-Russian side in the conflict. 
However, out of the 14 Ukrainian organizations – 10 are 
also pro-Ukrainian. Another interesting case is that of 
organizations that do not claim any ethnic identification 
(although in most cases these are predominantly 
Russian-speaking) but have been created to support 
the pro-Russian side of the conflict.
Taking these issues into account, and the fact 
that out of the 59 organizations analyzed in the 
current research, eight organizations were created 
with an aim directly connected to the current 
Ukrainian–Russian conflict, it can be suggested that 
the collaboration networks have also been changing 
according to the developments in Ukraine.
To analyze the networks, I use exponential 
random graph models (ERGMs) as they provide a 
method for modeling the probability of tie formation 
simultaneously for both the node attributes, such as 
ethnicity or type of organization, and the structural 
network statistics, such as triadic relationships or 
reciprocity between the organizations. One of the 
most important features of the ERGMs is that they 
assume network self-organization, in other words, 
tie dependence on each other. In comparison 
to other methods used in social sciences that 
assume independence of the individual subjects 
of one another, ERGMs give a more intuitive 
conceptualization of social networks as based on 
interconnectedness of actors in them. ERGMs also 
allow a lot of freedom for the researcher, by allowing 
multiple parameters to account for in the model, 
both concerning summary network statistics but 
also actor attributes (Lusher et al., 2013). In addition, 
ERGMs have often been used for the analysis of 
organizational collaboration networks (Fischer and 
Jasny, 2017).
As for limitations, ERGMs require a complete 
network to perform well (Lusher et al., 2013). To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, all Ukrainian, 
Russian, Russian-speaking, or conflict-generated 
organizations active in Sweden from 2013 to 2016 
have been included in the data set. However, the 
issues of network boundaries and inclusion criteria, 
as discussed above, might potentially have some 
implications for the parameters’ estimation of the 
ERGMs. In addition, since ERGMs are relatively 
new, in terms of development of the software, 
and are computationally intensive, they often lack 
convergence. Therefore, it is not always possible to 
compute every model, especially in the case of large 
networks (Lusher et al., 2013).
Data variables and measures
The attribute data for the nodes include information 
such as: type of organization (independent, umbrella, 
multinational), side taken by the organization in the 
conflict (pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian, neutral/no 
explicit statement), and “ethnicity” of the organization 
(Ukrainian, Russian, mixed Russians and Ukrainians, 
other ethnicity, no connection to any ethnicity/
nationality). The two attributes of most interest for 
the current paper are organizational “ethnicity” and 
organizational choice of sides in the conflict. I treat 
Table 1. Data frequencies.
Conflict side
Ethnicity Neutral Pro-Russian Pro-Ukrainian Total
Mixed (Russian-speaking)  8 1  0  9
Not national 12 6  1 19
Other national organizations 11 0  0 11
Russian  5 1  0  6
Ukrainian  4 0 10 14
Total 40 8 11 59
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pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian, or neutral as the three 
least complex attitudes toward the armed conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine that can be distinguished. By pro-
Russian attitude, I mean following the official position 
of the Russian Federation Government on both the 
Maidan Revolution and the ongoing war. This means 
that organizations sharing this attitude believe that 
the Maidan Revolution was a coup, and that there 
has been a threat to the Russian population in 
Eastern Ukraine, which justifies Russian troops in 
the region, while also supporting the annexation of 
the Crimean Peninsula (OSCE Russian delegation 
statement, 2018; Address by the President of the 
Russian Federation from March 2014, retrieved 
March 2019). By pro-Ukrainian attitude, I mean 
following the official position of the Ukrainian 
Government that condemns the annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula, does not believe there was a 
threat to the Russian population in Eastern Ukraine 
after the Maidan Revolution, and sees the revolution 
as getting rid of the corrupt government serving 
under the V. Yanukovych presidency (Ukraine 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). By neutral attitude, 
I mean that either an organization explicitly stated its 
neutrality in the matters of the conflict or they never 
had any event, post, or statement about any of these 
events on their official web pages.
Model specifications
ERGMs are not suitable for the 2013 data set 
because it only dates back to September, and thus 
has a very limited amount of both nodes and edges. 
However, that year was not yet marked by war or 
numerous deaths during the protests. The most 
active period, as discussed in the previous sections, 
was between the years 2014 and 2015 and which 
settled down by 2016, at least in comparison to the 
previous years (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). 
Therefore, the analysis here will only concern the 
period from 2014 to 2016.
All the models include the term “edges,” which 
serves as an intercept in the ERGMs and is a 
baseline probability of the tie formation (Lusher 
et al., 2013, p. 175). All the models start with the 
same baseline model, which includes network 
statistics such as measures of reciprocity and (in)
transitivity as well as geometrically weighted in- 
and out-degrees, which are more stable terms for 
controlling for degrees. They work by imposing a 
specific rate of decay by degree to control for the 
nodes with a higher degree to contribute less than 
those with lower degrees (capturing popularity and 
activity spread) (Lusher et al., 2013, p. 9; Morris 
et al., 2008). Every model also includes the term 
“intransitive,” which controls for the effects of triplets 
of type 111D, 201, 111U, 021C, or 030C (as per Davis 
and Leinhardt’s, 1972 typology) and thus relates to 
clustering of the networks. This term is useful for the 
observed data since, as will become evident later in 
the descriptive analysis of the networks, most cases 
are characterized with low transitivity indices. In 
sum, together with reciprocity, the intransitivity term 
controls for effects of connectivity of the triplets. This 
specification helps for model convergence and fit 
since it “powers” the geometrically weighted terms.
As for the node attributes that are covariates 
in the baseline models, these include type of 
organization, “ethnicity,” and the conflict side. Since 
some of the organizations are umbrella organizations 
or relatively bigger in size and fame than others, this 
measure captures the size of the node and thus also 
its attractiveness and popularity to a certain degree.
The second step adds a homophily term to test 
whether organizations that support a certain side of 
the conflict tend to form ties with other organizations 
that have exactly the same view on the conflict. 
Unfortunately, only for the 2015 models was it also 
possible to check the tendency of pro-Ukrainian 
organizations to specifically connect to other pro-
Ukrainian organizations, and pro-Russian ones to 
other pro-Russian ones (the model could converge 
with this particular specification of the term, while 
all the other models for the other networks lacked 
convergence).
Finally, the third step adds a homophily term on 
“ethnicity” of the organizations and tests whether 
organizations that identify with a certain ethnicity 
tend to form ties with organizations with the same 
identification.
As will be shown with descriptive results, 
especially for Ukrainian organizations, since there 
may be little heterogeneity on the standpoint toward 
the conflict and ethnicity, I performed multicollinearity 
checks for all the models that have both ethnic 
identification and conflict side parameters, 
by running them together and separately and 
comparing the results. If the results were different, 
then the full model included both “ethnicity” and 
“conflict side.” If they were not different, then the 
best fitted model is shown.
To assess the fit of the models, I use the AIC (the 
smaller the better) estimate and the goodness-of-
fit plots of the models given by the “Statnet:ergm” 
package in R software. The goodness of fit of the 
model is judged by the fit of degree distributions. I 
use p-values to assess the significance of the model 
parameters. Many argue that the p-value has a 
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meaning only in relation to what it could mean in the 
data and to the external context of the analysis, thus 
having a strict approach and regarding a parameter as 
significant only up to 0.05 level can be unnecessary 
and limiting. In addition, even though the ERGM 
Statnet package uses p-values, the ERGMs use Monte 
Carlo maximum likelihood estimation, for which taking 
confidence intervals as significance estimators makes 
more sense (Lusher et al., 2013). Therefore, I regard a 
parameter in the model as significant if the p-value has 
a value of up to 0.1 (at four levels).
Results
Descriptive and univariate  
network analysis
The period from 2013 to 2016 can be characterized 
by the growth of both the number of organizations 
and the amount of interorganizational connections 
for reasons discussed in the previous sections. The 
Figure 2: Network plots for the years of 2013 to 2016 (from left to right, row-wise).
four networks are completely different in structure, 
size, and also the frequency of interactions or the 
number of edges (Table 1 and Fig. 2). Moreover, 
new nodes appear in the network throughout the 
different years; hence, they should be analyzed 
separately (Table 2).
There is little transitivity between the nodes 
during 2013 and 2014. In 2015, the transitivity index 
suggests that some sort of clustering was taking 
place. Similarly, the network plots (Fig. 2) seem to 
further indicate some clustering along the ethnicity 
lines, especially for the years 2015 and 2016. If we 
take a closer look at the network plots for all the 
years (Fig. 2), in all of which the size of the node 
is based on the node degree, the above network 
properties also seem to have a strong relation with 
the node attributes (in Fig. 2, the nodal ethnicity 
attributes are shown in color). In addition to the 
descriptive properties discussed above, the plots 
hint on the clustering along ethnicity lines, which is 
stronger starting from year 2014 in the data set.
11
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Figure 3: Cross-tabulation correspondence map between categories “ethnicity” and “side of the 
conflict” in the data set.
Table 2. Descriptive network statistics.
Network size Density Edges (total) Reciprocity Transitivity
2013 15 0.06  12 0.88 0
2014 15 0.10  22 0.88 0
2015 27 0.12  88 0.90 0.43
2016 40 0.08 139 0.94 0.19
Figure 3 shows further that most of the 
Ukrainian organizations in the data set are on the 
pro-Ukrainian side, while Russian organizations 
take both pro-Russian and neutral positions, and 
organizations that are mixed or do not self-identify 
with any ethnicity have a lot of heterogeneity. 
Moreover, the absence of pro-Ukrainian–Russian 
organizations as well as pro-Russian Ukrainian 
organizations can also suggest that the conflict’s 
effect on the organizational network structure and 
that, at least for some organizations, the conflict 
in Eastern Ukraine, may have become a focus of 
activity, or possibly something that partially defines 
the organizational identity.
However, it is impossible to say whether this 
clustering is statistically meaningful and whether 
it is due to the data collection, the structure of the 
network, the node attributes, or the intersection of 
all three without any statistical inference. The next 
section aims to test exactly this question.
ERGM results
I start with the results from the 2014 model, which are 
presented below (Table 3; Fig. A1). The best fit from all 
of the three steps performed in the model is shown by 
step two, which takes into account homophily based 
on the attitude towards conflict. Interestingly, none of 
the covariates in the model are significant. The fact 
that neither the network structure nor nodal attributes 
of interest are significant, can pinpoint to the lag in 
creation of organizations that were specifically pro-
Russian as in comparison to those which were pro-
Ukrainian. In addition, since all the steps are showing 
very similar AIC values, the geometrically weighted 
in-degree parameter’s significance and positive value 
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Table 3. Exponential random graph model for 2014 network.
Baseline model Step 2 Step 3
Covariates Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Edges/intercept −4.92 3.38 −2.34 3.23 −2.48 3.15
Reciprocity 0.58 1.26 0.88 1.21 0.91 1.20
Intransitive −0.41 0.41 −0.26 0.37 −0.25 0.37
gw out-degree −0.93 2.52 −1.72 2.92 −1.68 2.81
gw in-degree (fixed 0.5) 2.66. 1.57 2.22 1.47 2.21 1.47
org. type umbrella organization −0.06 0.57 −0.12 0.46 −0.10 0.46
global
independent organization – 
reference category
. . . . .
ethnic ident. Ukrainian 1.37 1.00
Russian 0.01 1.21
mixed (Ukrainian and 
Russian) – reference category
.
other – –
no ethnic ident 0.87 0.99
conflict side pro-Russian
pro-Ukrainian
neutral – reference category
homophily on conflict side –0.51 0.64
on ethnic identification –0.25 0.66
AIC 113 112.2 112.9
Notes: 0 = ***; 0.001 = ** = 0.01; * = 0.05; . = 0.1.
in the baseline may give some information about 
the network. As discussed earlier, late 2013 to early 
2014 saw many new organizations being created as 
a direct response to what was happening in Ukraine. 
A lot of these organizations aimed to show support 
or opposition toward the Revolution or, later, the 
developments in Eastern Ukraine. To be able to have 
a bigger impact, many of these organizations may 
have started to connect to other big organizations 
that were already established before and thus had 
more “power” in this particular field. This would 
contribute to the larger popularity (measured by 
geometrically weighted in-degree) of some actors in 
the network, showing that the network is centralized 
on in-degree. On the other hand, some organizations 
may have been very active in reaching out to many 
other organizations to make themselves known in 
this field. Therefore, the analysis of the 2014 network 
suggests that there is some potential clustering in the 
network. However, since neither ethnicity nor attitude 
toward the conflict is significant as well as reflecting 
that there is no homophily in the collaboration network 
based on shared attitudes toward the conflict – H1 is 
supported.
For the 2015 network (Table 4; Fig. A2), Step 2 of 
the models shows the best fit. Both network structure 
and node attributes matter for the log-odds of a tie 
between the organizations in 2015. The large negative 
value on the intercept (term, edges) means that the 
network is sparse. The “intransitive” term is significant 
and negative, suggesting the tendency for decreasing 
number of intransitive triplets. Interestingly, the 
reciprocity term is now positive and significant. These 
two terms taken together give indication toward the 
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Another significant covariate of the model is 
the conflict side, where the pro-Russian side has 
a significant and positive value. This shows that 
organizations that are pro-Russian tend to have 
higher log-odds of a tie with any other organization 
than those that do not take a clear side in the 
conflict. This may suggest that the significance of 
sharing a point of view with an organization that other 
organizations connect to does not have the same 
meaning anymore. One reason could be that in the 
year before, the definitions of the sides of support 
were already established and these organizations 
that share the same views have already connected; 
perhaps, it makes more sense to expand the 
connections, or not, to other organizations no matter 
what their view. Thus, H3 is supported.
Discussion and conclusions
The results show that the conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
may have become a focus of activity for many 
Ukrainian and Russian organizations active in Sweden. 
The clustering of the organizations along the conflict 
attitude lines is shown to be significant, especially 
during the most violent period of the war (2015). 
The pro-Ukrainian organizations seem to be more 
active and show a stronger tendency for homophily, 
especially in the 2015 network. The results also 
show that the side of the conflict that an organization 
takes might be a stronger driver to collaborating 
with other organizations, thus suggesting that the 
re-identification of the organization from only based 
on identification with a certain ethnicity to primarily 
conflict-oriented took place during the period studied. 
In other words, it is the attitude toward the conflict 
that might now define collaboration decisions, and 
not only the perception of similar “roots and routes.”
In addition, early 2014 saw some pro-Ukrainian 
organizations being created as a response to the 
Maidan Revolution and most Ukrainians proclaiming 
their political orientation (mostly pro-revolution) toward 
it. On the other hand, in late 2014 and 2015, a lot of pro-
Russian organizations (six) were created as a response 
to the openly acknowledged Russian involvement, 
while the pre-existing Russian organizations 
claimed mostly neutrality. By late 2014, most of the 
organizations had a fixed political stance, including 
neutrality. These pro-Russian organizations rarely 
claimed to be Russian, and were mostly concerned 
with spreading the “truth” about the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine. This has further driven and changed the 
field according to the conflict lines and pushed the 
organizations to collaborate only with those who share 
the same view on the conflict. More specifically, by 
difference in the network structure and show that 
reciprocal connections in 2015 were more likely. The 
in-degree term is not significant for the network in 
2015, as opposed to the out-degree. More precisely, 
it shows a relatively large negative value. The 
geometrically weighted out-degree term measures 
the activity spread; in cases where it is negative, it 
indicates that the majority of the actors in a network 
have similar levels of activity and thus, the network 
is not centralized on out-degree (Lusher et al., 2013). 
This suggests that in 2015, the organizations that 
were created in 2013 to 2014 in response to the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine were already established 
within the structure at that point.
What is most interesting about Step 2 in the 
2015 network model is the significant (at 0.1 level) 
homophily value on the supported side of the conflict 
term for pro-Ukrainian organizations, which suggests 
that pro-Ukrainian organizations tend to have ties 
with similar (pro-Ukrainian) organizations. While 
performing the sensitivity analysis, the fit of the model 
without controlling for ethnic identification was better. 
However, since the descriptive analysis showed that 
there is little variation for the Ukrainian organizations in 
their attitudes toward the conflict, it can be assumed 
that this model does capture ethnicity. However, 
Step 3 of the model shows ethnic homophily as 
non-significant, and does not converge if the control 
for conflict side attitude is taken out. Thus, it could 
arguably be understood that the attitude toward the 
conflict is a more steering parameter than ethnicity. 
Therefore, H3 is supported by the results from the 
2015 network. This was the only model that managed 
to converge with detailed ethnicity specifications.
The model for the 2016 network (Table 5; Fig. A3) 
shows the best fit in the baseline. Unfortunately, 
due to technical issues related to the computations 
in the ERGMs, Steps 2 and 3 in the models for the 
2016 network did not converge and thus are not 
presented here. After performing a sensitivity check, 
and to avoid multicollinearity, the better fit model in the 
baseline was the one using conflict side as a control, 
and not ethnicity. Again, the large negative value on 
the intercept means that the network is sparse, while 
geometrically-weighted in-degree being significant and 
positive indicates that larger organizations might be 
receiving more connections, and the non-significance 
of the negative “intransitive” term that controls for the 
intransitive triplets which all suggest that clustering 
within the network remains. The geometrically 
weighted out-degree term is still negative and indicates 
that most actors have a similar level of activity and that 
the network does not tend to be centralized on the 
out-degrees (Lusher et al., 2013).
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2015, the pro-Ukrainian organizations were more likely 
to collaborate with other organizations that identified 
as being pro-Ukrainian. Interestingly though, the pro-
Ukrainian organizations were less likely to have ties 
and thus engage in collaboration by 2016, probably 
because all the pro-Ukrainian organizations had 
already collaborated with each other by that point. In 
addition, after most of the pro-Ukrainian organizations 
connected with each other, there were none left in the 
organizational field  –  and with no new organizations 
being created, by 2016 the pro-Ukrainian organizations 
were less likely to collaborate with others in general. On 
the other hand, the pro-Russian organizations tended 
to be more likely to collaborate with other organizations 
in 2016, which is interesting since they were not 
significantly different from the neutral organizations in 
2014 and 2015. One explanation could be that many 
of the pro-Russian organizations became most active 
and established in the organizational field in the late 
2014 and 2015, and therefore only in 2016 could they 
accumulate enough collaborations to be somewhat 
different from the neutral ones.
To summarize, the fact that the attitude toward 
conflict explains tie formation within the collaboration 
networks for 2015 and 2016 better than ethnicity 
suggests that conflict in the homeland can become 
a focus of activity for organizations in a third country, 
and in this sense rearrange the organizational field. 
Ethnic homophily probably present before, and based 
on already established relations and boundaries, loses 
its clustering potential when a new focus appears as 
an important factor for activism. This further suggests 
Table 5. Exponential random graph model for 2016 network 
(Steps 2 and 3 not converged).
Baseline model
Covariates Estimate SE
Edges/intercept −1.14* 0.50
reciprocity 1.99** 0.65
intransitive −0.01 0.05
gw in-degree 0.81. 0.46
gw out-degree −3.72*** 0.40
org. type umbrella organization −0.16 0.19
independent organization – reference 
category
. .
global 0.17 0.19
ethnic ident. Ukrainian
Russian
mixed (Ukrainian and Russian) – 
reference category
other
no ethnic id.
conflict side pro-Russian 0.29* 0.13
pro-Ukrainian −0.20 0.26
neutral – reference category . .
homophily on conflict side
on ethnic ident.
AIC 416.7
Notes: 0 = ***; 0.001 = ** = 0.01; * = 0.05; . = 0.1.
16
Ukrainian and Russian organizations in Sweden and the conflict back home
that ethnic boundary-making processes are contextual 
and evolving, not only in relation to the context of 
the country of residence but also with regard to the 
political developments in the home country. Similar 
to Féron (2017), I suggest that conflict may become 
de-territorialized from its geographical location using 
similar symbols and ideas; however, thereafter, it can 
become reshaped within the context of diasporic 
experiences and finally become autotomized from the 
original conflict. This can be the case with the Russian 
and Ukrainian organizations as they seem to have 
renegotiated collaboration practices from basing them 
on ethnic identification to verification of the attitude to 
the conflict of the other organizations. Furthermore, 
these results may indicate that the meaning of 
ethnicity for the studied organizations, especially those 
identifying as Ukrainian, has become intertwined with 
the perception of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and 
thus incorporating being pro-Ukrainian in a political 
sense, with the meaning of being Ukrainian within the 
multiple understandings of defining ethnicity.
Finally, although not generalizable, the results found 
in this study further suggest that armed conflicts can 
be “imported” or re-territorialized into other contexts 
and should be accounted for when studying ethnic 
groups, transnational communities, or diasporas whose 
“homeland” has been in an ongoing armed conflict.
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Figure A1: Goodness-of-fit plot for the best fit model for 2014 network.
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Appendix. Goodness-of-fit diagnostics
I am presenting goodness-of-fit plots only for the best fit models per year.
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Figure A2: Goodness-of-fit plot for the best fit model for 2015 network.
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Figure A3: Goodness-of-fit plot for the best fit model for 2016 network.
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